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The Purlieu Letter. Toward a Hegelian 
Theory of Conditioning
Frank Ruda
“In him, connection is not a matter of unbroken transition 
[Übergang] but a matter of sudden change [Umschlag], 
and the process takes place not through the moments ap-
proaching one another but through rupture.” (Adorno)
“The later spirit is that it knows what the earlier was.” 
(Hegel)
1. Some Like It (Too) Late
How to know when it is too late? It seems it can hardly get any 
more trivial than this. Just look at the clock, obviously. Check the 
appointment, check the time and there you go. If you are too late 
this means, as the English expression goes, you are not on time. 
But what if it were not so easy to find the right clock? With the 
previous empirical procedure, we can easily determine objective 
belatedness, within the framework of objective and objectively 
measurable time. But this method does not give us the means to 
determine all sorts of delay. What if some things happen within 
the framework of objective history that then and only belatedly 
can be registered and thought and worked through elsewhere? 
What if this means there could be a kind of structural belated-
ness even regarding or within objective time? How to measure 
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such a lag if it were to precede all temporal registers? Does such 
delay necessitate another kind of chronometer, an absolute kind 
of knowing that would be able to bridge the gaps of time? Is this 
what absolute knowing was always about: knowing when it is 
really or rather absolutely too late? 
The famous Hegelian account of philosophy’s constitutive be-
latedness can, as is more than well-known, be found in the Vorrede 
or Vorwort—Hegel uses both terms—to his Philosophy of Right.1 
It can be found in the discourse that precedes the beginning of the 
proper philosophical discourse. If the Vorrede is structurally placed 
before the book that it prefaces, what is said about philosophy in 
it must be said structurally too early or pre-philosophically. Hegel 
begins to close the preface of the Philosophy of Right by stating: 
“But it is time to close this preface [Vorwort]. After all, as preface, 
its only business has been to make some external and subjective 
remarks about the standpoint of the book it introduces” (Hegel 
2008, p. 16). This is what Hegel states right after he uses the (in)
famous owl of Minerva image and thus after he indicates that 
philosophy begins when “a shape of life has grown old” (ibid.). It 
seems that as soon as one records that philosophy always comes 
too late, it is immediately time to close that which precedes phi-
losophy. When one states that philosophy always comes too late, 
it seems the right time to begin with philosophy. If philosophy 
comes too late, it seems its very own belatedness can only be ad-
dressed from outside of philosophy or too early. There seems to 
be a paradox here: if philosophy always comes too late, it seems 
to come too late to say that it comes too late and hence there is no 
philosophical way to say anything about philosophy’s belatedness. 
Maybe philosophy can even only realize too late what philosophy 
is. Does it realize too late what it is to come too late?  
1 Vorrede is used in the table of contents and as title of the preface, Vor-
wort is used at the end. I will return to this almost immediately. Cf. Hegel 1986, 
pp. 4, 11, 27
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Philosophy, this seems clear, comes too late. It comes struc-
turally so late that it could never admit to this on time. It is there-
fore constitutively Nachwort, epilogue, unavoidably postscript. 
After the preface is the obituary—nach der Vorrede der Nachruf. 
Philosophy is not the language of the young and living, but of 
the old, of the almost dead or of those who are no longer alive 
but who still need to be understood and, in this sense, still have 
something to say; of those die nach uns rufen, who are, and maybe 
silently, calling out to us. Philosophy as Nachruf, as epilogue is 
then not silent, but it speaks the language of what is at the end of 
its life, of the life grown old: it is the language of old men—and 
one should here remember that Hegel’s nickname from when he 
was in the Tubingen seminary was precisely that: the old man. 
So, he might have learned this language already rather early in his 
life. Philosophy’s language therefore might ultimately even be the 
language of the cripple.2 Philosophy is thus not simply reminisc-
ing about how great it was before, when there was no philosophy. 
Philosophy is not—or maybe not only—the cigarette after, but 
the word, the calling after the act, it is Nachwort, Nachruf, or 
Nachrede. The Nachrede which might also describe philosophy’s 
status—a term that literally means postface in the sense in which 
the preface is the Vorrede—is used in the German language as 
a noun only in the sense of libel, ill-speech, as üble Nachrede, 
slander or defamation.3 But if philosophy has a relation to slander, 
this is less the case because it itself would be the speaking ill about 
the preceding historical discourse, act or deed after whose end 
philosophy begins its flight. It rather seems to be linked to the 
2 Adorno remarked somewhere that one can even see efforts of thoughts 
manifesting in the deep wrinkles in Hegel’s face on some of his portraits. From 
here one might find an obvious connection with the old man in Beckett’s work 
(just think of Krapp’s Last Tape for example).
3 One can use it as a verb and then it means that one repeats acoustically 
(nachreden) what someone else said, so it presents us with a discourse that re-
doubles what precedes it. It is like an echo of its precedent.
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very practice of philosophy itself. It is a practice attracting üble 
Nachrede auf den Nachruf, slander about philosophy’s status as 
epilogue, always coming late. 
It is like a less funny version of the famous joke cited by Lacan 
about my fiancé who is never late because the moment she is late, 
she is no longer my fiancé. Philosophy is always too late, because 
the moment it is not too late, it would no longer be philosophy (for 
example, journalism or politics). Already the early Marx derived 
from this a desire for philosophy to arrive on time. But timing is 
nevertheless a defining criterion of philosophy. It must arrive on 
time, but its time is too late. All of this is obviously complicated 
by the need for philosophy to miss the right appointment and 
not the wrong one. In coming too late, even though this might 
sound surprising, there is always a wager involved: the wager that 
decides that now the time is ripe to punctuate the world with an 
intervention, because a shape of spirit has grown old. Sometimes 
shapes of spirit might look younger and more alive than they are 
and some old shapes might drag on forever, even though their 
time has already come.4 This may amount to a complex way of 
waiting in the centre of philosophy’s proceedings, but it may also 
remind us of Hegel’s depiction of the dialectics of sense certainty 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit, where every attempt to grasp the 
“now” in the “now” just leads us to an endless process of missing 
the “now” and thereby an insight into a pre-structural belatedness 
of empirical temporality itself.5 The wager of philosophy is that 
it is now the right time for it to arrive too late.
4 This is an argument that can easily be applied to Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right itself, for which it can be claimed that it can only depict the state it depicts 
because this very state has grown old and is about to disappear (and the book also 
ends with the transition into world-history). In Žižek’s words: “Robert Pippin 
noted that, if Hegel is minimally consistent, this has to apply also to the notion 
of State deployed in his own Philosophy of Right: the fact that Hegel was able to 
deploy its concept means that dusk is falling on what readers of Hegel usually 
perceive as a normative description of a model rational state” Žižek 2016, p. 113.
5 Cf. Hegel 2018, pp. 60–8.
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2. Biographies of the Afterlife
Ernst Bloch insinuated that one can compare philosophy’s opera-
tion to that of a detective—something not foreign to Freudian psy-
choanalysis—since the latter also always comes after the crime.6 
In this image it is the crime, even if and maybe especially when 
there is no corpse and when it is hard to detect if something hap-
pened at all, that brings the detective onto the scene. Philosophy 
also seeks to detect what truly happened. Therein it may often be 
unclear what the crime is. Some may, with Brecht, just identify it 
as the founding (or perhaps more adequate these days, the bailing 
out) of a yet another bank. Philosophy, due to its belatedness, has 
always been a rather disastrous crime-preventer. But this ought 
not lead anyone to believe it to be the ultimate criminal in the 
vein of Popper and the like. Adorno famously begins his Negative 
Dialectics with a claim addressing philosophy’s present temporal-
ity. He argued that the only reason why there still is philosophy 
is because it came so late, it even missed “the moment” to be 
“realize(d)” (Adorno 2007, p. 3). After missing an appointment, it 
really should have attended, it began leading a strange afterlife, a 
Nachleben. Now, it must come to terms with the problems newly 
created by missing its own realization. Therefore, it must “ruth-
lessly criticize itself” (ibid.). Philosophy’s only task is to offer a 
critical account of its own failure not to fail, whereby ultimately 
philosophy stops being philosophy and turns into critical theory. 
Philosophy came too late, whereby it is led to perform its own 
funeral of which it as the sole survivor now has to mourn that 
philosophy never did what it never could. This is what Cioran 
once called an original mourning (Cioran 1992, p. 31). 
This is not Hegel’s position. Neither is philosophy a criminal 
doing the deed, nor is it the supposed hero that turns out to be a 
6 Bloch therefore claims that the detective novel (as philosophy) has “the 
crime [Untat] as something that already happened still outside of it, before it, it 
blurts out with the corpse [fällt mit der Leiche ins Haus].” Bloch 1985, p. 254.
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crippled disappointment. Hegel claims that “philosophy in any 
case always arrives on the scene too late to give it” (Hegel 2008, 
p. 16). “It” here being “instructions as to what the world ought to 
be” (ibid.), “das Belehren, wie die Welt sein soll” (Hegel 1986, p. 
27). Philosophy does not arrive early enough to offer prescriptions 
of how the world out to be or what to do. But it must draw a line 
of demarcation, namely between what seems to be and what truly 
is. This does not mean—as a Heideggerian would argue—that it 
aims to conceive of the truth of being (even though, in Heidegger, 
Dasein also always comes too late7). It rather means that philoso-
phy’s task is to think being from the perspective of truth or the 
absolute. And the latter’s time is that of constitutive belatedness, 
of the delay. Whenever philosophy seeks to give instructions and 
solve problems, this expresses a rather problematic understand-
ing of the relation between philosophy and actuality. Philosophy 
shall aim at the “comprehension [Erfassen] of the present and the 
actual” (Hegel 2008, p. 13), but when it tells people what to do, it 
takes the present to be “something vacuous [ein Eitles] and looks 
beyond it with the eyes of superior wisdom” (ibid., p. 14). When 
philosophy does not comprehend the present-actual, it begins too 
early and cannot but help to speak about and aim at a “beyond, 
supposed to exist” (ibid., p. 13). There are right forms of coming 
too late and certainly coming too early does not seem an option 
either. Timing is thus of the essence.
The moment philosophy arrives on the scene too early its 
proposals are projected into an eternal future, always to come. 
Instruction-giving falls prey to “the vanity of superior wisdom 
[die Eitelkeit der Besserwisserei]” (Hegel 2008, p. 14; Hegel 1985, 
p. 26). Arriving too early comes with the temptation that one 
already has all (knowledge) one needs, but this is, obviously, 
7 And in the notorious conversation with the Spiegel, he claimed: “philo-
sophy will be unable to effect any immediate change in the current state of the 
world. This is true not only of philosophy but of all purely human reflection 
and endeavor.” Heidegger 1981, p. 57.
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premature. It will then never end to claim things for which it will 
never be late enough to realize them. There must always come a 
better crisis. It is like a conversation in which philosophy is the 
only one talking. To grasp “the eternal which is present” (Hegel 
2008, p. 14), it must discriminate between what is and what is not 
(in truth). Against philosophy turning into premature and empty 
wisdom chatter, Hegel’s allows the “things themselves [to] speak 
in a philosophy that focuses its energies on proving that it is itself 
one with them” (Adorno 1993, p. 6). Philosophy must come too 
late to avoid voiding its own discourse in advance.8 When it gives 
instructions and converts, when it belehrt und bekehrt, it concedes 
to a problematic form of dogmatic religion—and something simi-
lar happens when it takes the present to be the only measure that 
counts. As one of the rather amusing reviews of the Philosophy 
of Right introduces into one of Hegel’s famous formulas: noth-
ing is “verkehrter” (Anonymous 1973, p. 465), nothing is more 
wrong, or more inverted, or upside down, or perverse “than to 
expect from a philosophical writing that it constructs a state how 
it ought to be.” It “can only show how the state, the ethical uni-
verse, should be understood” (Hegel 2008, p. 15). Philosophy is a 
demonstration of a way of understanding the realm of objectivity. 
But to do so philosophy needs its proper distance: philosophy 
must therefore operate at a distance from the state (of things). This 
implies that philosophy can easily fail to be philosophy—and this 
is part of the history of previous philosophy. 
3. Revolutionizing 
Starting to paint the grey in grey always implies a wager. It 
might always happen that philosophy starts painting too early. 
If philosophy provides a grasp—eine Fassung—of its time in the 
8 Since otherwise it only produces empty promises that it can never fulfill. 
This is what in Hegel’s account happened with Kant. Cf. Ruda 2018.
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form of thought, as the famous adage goes, the wager concerns 
this very time, namely that it reached an end, that one can get a 
hold of it. “There is no right time or ‘ripe time’ for revolution 
(or there would be no need of one)” (Comay 2011, p. 7). When 
things are too ripe and decaying, it is time for philosophy. “The 
Revolution always arrives too soon (conditions are never ready) 
and too late (it lags forever behind its own initiative)” (ibid). Has 
Hegel’s philosophy inherited this paradoxical temporality from 
the French revolution? Rebecca Comay read Hegel’s Phenomenol-
ogy so that it depicts all possible ways in which one can attempt 
to ward off a revolution, Kantian philosophy being one of those 
attempts (Ibid., pp. 81ff). For Hegel who never gave up on his 
commitment to the French Revolution—despite his fundamental 
critique of the terror—it cannot be a surprise that philosophy is 
conditioned by the revolutionary untimely temporality:9 always 
at risk of arriving too early, never knowing in advance, when 
precisely it is too late. This, again, is no surprise as Hegel already 
early on identified Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as a “revolution 
in the system of ideas” (Hegel 1984, p. 35) but insisted—in line 
with Schelling and Fichte—that it needs a radicalized continua-
tion, a Fortgang.
Hegel’s philosophy is conditioned by the revolution. What 
follows is an attempt to examine what precisely this means. As 
Jean-Claude Milner claimed, “in classic French, each mutation in 
human affairs could be called a revolution, if it is about medicine, 
politics, literature or each other field of activity” (Milner 2016, p. 
76). This includes even the planetary orbit that (recall Polybius) 
stands for stability. But the revolution that Hegel’s thought is 
conditioned by is one that obviously breaks with natural cycles. 
Michael Theunissen noted that in Hegel’s account of religion, 
which is itself placed in the centre, e.g., in the position of the cop-
ula in absolute spirit (e.g. art, religion, philosophy),  Christianity 
9 Cf. the extraordinary text by Hamacher: Hamacher 2006.
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was revolutionary (Theunissen 1970). Hegel himself remarked 
“that nowhere are to be found such revolutionary utterances as 
in the Gospels” (Hegel 1991, p. 345). Christianity thereby, as 
Slavoj Žižek has also shown repeatedly throughout his oeuvre, 
provides not only the form of revolution in the sphere of religion, 
so that God is ultimately nothing but the collective practice of the 
community of believers, it also offers a template that structures 
all kinds of operations of spirit—which is why it is crucial that 
religion stands in the position of the copula. Wherever it copu-
lates, there is religion. And religion stands in the midst of spirit 
only revolving around itself. Theunissen: “Hegel understands 
Christianity as the pervasive centre—Mittelpunkt—and in no 
way as isolated point of passage. From the centre, Christianity 
radiates into the beginning and end of the whole development” 
(Theunissen 1970, p. 94). Christianity is revolution in the form 
of religion. It is revolutionary because it is for Hegel the religion 
of the dissolution of religion, the religion of the end of religion, 
atheistic religion, as it were. He therefore also calls it the “great 
turning point” (Hegel 1973, p. 517).
4. Thought-Revolution
Hegel’s thought is conditioned by revolution, meaning he thinks 
from the perspective of the revolution. But this does not mean 
that thinking is constantly thinking about revolution nor that 
there was a revolution in our ways of thinking. Rather it means to 
revolutionize what we mean by thinking, whereby thinking must 
itself revolutionize what it means to think thinking. This does 
not mean that a political revolution is over-determining Hegel’s 
thought, as if there were a subterranean politicality in it. Rather 
it means that if Hegel’s thought is conditioned by the revolution 
this can neither mean that it takes the revolution as content nor 
as form alone, but that revolution becomes the way of relating 
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form and content and thus of thinking itself. This implies that 
all concepts in Hegel must be conceived of from the afformative 
point of view of the revolution.10 In the Logic the high conceptual 
demands of this become clear already when Hegel elaborates the 
concepts of “something” and of “the other” and “of othering” 
as something that then confronts us with concerns about how 
(not) to remain identical in a process of differentiation.11 If one 
can read this just as one example of what it means to conceive of 
revolution as a way of thinking, we are in this case—because it 
is the Logic—talking about a revolution that even precedes time 
and is pre-phenomenal, but that nonetheless creates a new world 
of its own. 
Hegel thinks from the standpoint of the revolution and crea-
tion of novelty. But this also means to conceive of the problems 
and “dead branches” (Badiou 2009, p. 10f.) revolutionary crea-
tion runs into, of the resistances it cannot but produce and of 
the repetitions (good or bad) that enable or hinder its unfolding. 
His perspective is that of the immanence of truths, of the im-
manence of the revolution. This unavoidably implies that even 
counter-revolution or resistance to revolution is part of think-
ing—one must in this sense always also think Kant’s philosophy 
warding off the revolution from the standpoint of revolution, 
as Hegel does in the Phenomenology. One must think from this 
standpoint, as this standpoint is the only standpoint of thinking: 
“the whole transition [Übergang]—from the older to the newer 
times—turns around this—the revolution in the world” (Hegel 
1986, p. 158); a revolution so novel, that “never since the sun had 
stood in the firmament and the planet revolved around him had 
it been perceived that man’s existence centres in his head, i.e. in 
Thought, inspired by which he builds up the world of reality” 
(Hegel 1991, p. 466). 
10 Cf. Hamacher 1994.
11 Cf. Hegel 2010, pp. 83ff.
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But if Hegel’s thought is conditioned by the revolution, 
how to read Hegel’s comment that has been brought to mind by 
others before about the present status of the French Revolution? 
He indicates that it is strangely still too early for philosophy to 
comprehend what it is conditioned by and that it poses a problem 
for later generations to solve. In the following, Hegel’s remark 
will be elucidated by turning to what I want to call the German 
debate about Hegel and the French revolution. It means return-
ing to two classical texts, one by Joachim Ritter, the other by 
Jürgen Habermas. I will demonstrate in what way both present 
unsatisfying solutions regarding philosophy’s status vis-à-vis the 
problem that is the revolution.
5. The Revolution as Problem
Almost at the end of his Philosophy of History—and thus by 
implication, at the end of history—one finds one of the few 
passages in which Hegel talks about the future. This passage is 
located in Hegel’s discussion of the French Revolution and the 
crucial problem is brought forth, namely that it put into practice 
and operated such a purified and thus abstract form of freedom 
that it “allows no political organization to be firmly established” 
(Hegel 1991, p. 473). The concept of freedom put into practice 
by the French Revolution confronts the thinker and the world 
with a problem. This problem is the problem of organization: 
how to organize the equality of the free—and this means of eve-
ryone—when it is by definition impossible to exclude anyone 
in advance from participating and one must persistently sustain 
and reproduce the equaliberty (Balibar 2014) of all its members? 
The revolution has undone any assumption of natural inequality 
by spiriting away also any assumption that there are any shared 
given natural properties, except that everyone can be killed and is 
hence mortal. The French Revolution thus posed a problem and 
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this problem is the way its persistent actuality appears. How to 
organize freedom, collectively? The French Revolution persists 
as a problem and this is why “agitation and unrest are perpetu-
ated. This collision … this problem is that with which history 
is now occupied” (Hegel 1991, p. 473). Against the background 
of philosophy always arriving too late, this is a surprising claim: 
history is now, in the present occupied with the problem that is 
the French Revolution. And it is this problem “whose solution 
[history] has to work out in the future” (ibid.). History after the 
revolution is conditioned by the problem that is the revolution 
and remains under its spell unless it finds a solution. 
This is the verdict of a philosophy that tries to come appropri-
ately too late. It can now only acknowledge that what there is, is a 
persistent, as yet unsolved problem. But the problem is not only 
a problem for history. It is also a problem for philosophy since it 
directly pertains to the main concept of (Hegelian) philosophy: 
freedom. Some aspects of this problem can be pointedly recon-
structed by recourse to what Walter Benjamin termed destructive 
character—which also implies a specific interpretation of freedom. 
It “knows only one watchword: make room [räumen]. And only 
one activity: clearing away.... For destroying rejuvenates, because 
it clears away the traces of our own age” (Benjamin 1999, 541). 
The destructive character tries to rejuvenate when it is too late. 
Hegel’s name for this destructive aspect is fanaticism which 
“recognizes in all Dasein a limitation and wants to destroy it 
to be free, it is…only the greatness of destruction measures the 
greatness of freedom” (Hegel 1974, p. 113). The French Revolu-
tion revolutionized the understanding of freedom, liberated it 
from all given and thus not freely chosen determinations. But it 
got stuck in revolutionizing. Like a compulsion to revolutionize 
that therefore ultimately became destructive and in self-negating, 
destructively restorative. But to avoid falling back to the position 
of common sense one must see therein more than just destructive 
negativity. Because otherwise one sees in it, similar to what one 
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would see in speculative thought, “only… its nullifying activity 
[Vernichten]; and even its nullification is not visible in its entire 
scope” (Hegel 1977, 102f). 
The problem that is the revolution is how to think the revo-
lution, how to think the revolution in a revolutionary way. The 
problem is thus already how to organize thought such that it re-
ally thinks the revolution (so thinking the revolution is a problem 
that concerns the Logic of thinking). We are thus here not only 
encountering a problem vis-à-vis a general concept, but rather one 
that pertains to the practice of the concept (of freedom), a problem 
of its Vollzugsweise, its performative or afformative realization. 
How to think and, therefore, organize the concrete universality 
of singular and singularly collective freedom afformatively? The 
problem of organization is thus a question of how to stabilize 
the revolution. It is what Žižek so insistently (Žižek 2006, p. 157) 
called the problem of the day after; how to make the revolution 
last without ending in an endless compulsion to revolutionize or 
betray its very principles?
6. Conditioning: The German Debate
The relation between Hegel and the French Revolution has been 
commented on endlessly. There are many affirmative, negative 
and critical accounts of this relation. One that is systematically 
interesting in the present context is the account offered by the 
rather liberal conservative German philosopher Ritter. He argued 
that the reason of the revolution is for Hegel identical to reason 
as such. This is to say, a historical event can embody reason tout 
court, which is what “is encountered [in Hegel]…for the first time 
in the history of philosophy [because he] equates traditional meta-
physical theory directly as such with knowledge of the age and 
the present” (Ritter 1986, p. 39f). Hegel’s philosophy is rigorously 
modern, because it is inherently nothing but a theory of time, 
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of its own time grasped in thought. Thereby it cannot but raise 
the question of what constitutes its present and this is especially 
pressing when traditional answers of how to conceive of one’s own 
time—romantic or naturalistic ones—became problematic. Hegel 
is the first who attempted to think history historically, in him “the 
present has emancipated itself from the philosophical tradition” 
(ibid., p. 41). That he witnessed the French Revolution during 
his lifetime is even better for the facts. “For Hegel, the French 
Revolution is that event around which all the determinations of 
philosophy in relation to its time are clustered, with philosophy 
marking out the problem through attacks on and defenses of the 
Revolution. Conversely, there is no other philosophy that is a 
philosophy of revolution to such a degree and so profoundly, in 
its innermost drive, as that of Hegel” (ibid., p. 43). 
Hegel is the philosopher of the revolution. He is the philoso-
pher of the revolution as an unfinished project, as ongoing. The 
revolution constitutes modern time and, according to Ritter, is 
what must be thought to be a true contemporary. But it is on-
going as a problem. A problem that is constitutive of history as 
the search for its solution is what drives history forward. This is 
why Ritter speaks of the revolution as a “new era [Zeitwende]” 
(ibid., p. 50), as a temporal turning point, and Hegel refers to it 
as “the nodus [der Knoten]” (Hegel 1991, p. 472), where history 
stands. This knot, the English term is even more fitting than the 
German, not yet untied, not yet unravelled, it is a knot not un-
knotted. Unknotting the knot is the task and maybe one should 
risk claiming that Hegel’s thought because of this knot in general 
resolves around unnot-ting the not? The (k)not is what makes 
history, what history must shoulder. It must cut the knot, follow 
the strings, and more concretely solve the problem immanent 
to the political realization of singular collective freedom (that is 
therefore proclaimed a universal right). Even in its problematic 
form, as Ritter argues, Hegel defends the revolution against all 
restorative tendencies: it is an event, already because going back 
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behind what it achieved even in failing cannot but appear regres-
sive. But Ritter suggests that the medium in which Hegel seeks 
to solve the problem that is the revolution is ultimately that of 
civil society. There might be arguments for this reading, but it 
remains, and Ritter clearly indicates this, too, unconvincing. Civil 
society as concept can certainly be read as a kind of answer to the 
question of how to realize a necessarily singular freedom in an 
also necessarily collective form and interaction. The problem is 
that it does not solve the problem of how to make this freedom 
actual for all. 
Civil society is not an adequate organizational form for singu-
lar collective freedom to be realized, which is why inequality and 
structural violence keep resurging in it. This is in part because civil 
society, as capitalism in general, never solves problems. It simply 
invents new forms of how to delay dealing with them (colonies, 
for example). Civil society is, as Hegel demonstrates, inherently 
contradictory. These contradictions appear in the antagonism 
of the rich and the poor, and their respective rabble-types12 and 
even the state is not able to resolve these kinds of contradictions 
(which is one reason as to why, in the end, even the state disap-
pears in the ocean of history). For Ritter, this is a symptom that 
the problem that is the revolution is not yet solved by history 
and therefore could not have been solved by Hegel. Hegel’s 
greatness consists, then, in having transformed philosophy into 
a theory of its own time. Because this is what being conditioned 
by the revolution means for philosophy: a new conception of and 
relation to time. The constitution of a new present, the present 
of the revolution, forces philosophy to reshape the constitution 
of time, e.g. its concept of time. Conditioned by the French 
Revolution, philosophy thinks its time by conceiving of what 
constitutes (properly historical) time—this is the eternal in the 
present. Ritter claimed that “there is no other philosophy that is 
12 Cf. Ruda 2011.
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a philosophy of  revolution to such a degree and so profoundly, 
in its innermost drive, as that of Hegel” (Ritter 1982, p. 43), but 
it is slightly oblivious of the grandiosity of its own claim after all, 
since it only detects its effects in the domain of objective spirit. 
He claims that Hegel’s thinking is conditioned by the revolution, 
yet he only traces in what way the problem that is the revolu-
tion conditions his political thought. There the problem remains 
a problem. Ritter does not account for what being conditioned 
by the revolution means for the sphere of absolute spirit and 
thereby he does ultimately not account at all for what it means 
for a philosophy to be conditioned by a historico-political event. 
He has no theory of conditioning.13 Therefore it remains unclear 
how objective and absolute spirit are supposed to be mediated. 
But if this remains unclear, it remains unclear what is supposed 
by saying that Hegel’s is a philosophy conditioned by and thus a 
philosophy of the revolution, even though Ritter’s remark points 
in the right direction.
Jürgen Habermas has taken up Ritter’s reading of Hegel 
and modified what Ritter articulated as praise into a structural 
critique. It goes like this: the form in which Hegel endorses the 
French Revolution is what makes him part of the restoration. It is 
an example of what Adorno with Anna Freud called “identifica-
tion with the aggressor” (Adorno 1993a, p. 37). Habermas states: 
“Hegel celebrates the revolution because he fears it” and “Hegel’s 
philosophy of revolution is his philosophy as the critique of the 
revolution” (Habermas 1973, p. 121). His point is that Hegel 
argues that the revolution is the world historical event in which 
abstract right is claimed in its universality for the first time, but – 
as his praise of Napoleon for Habermas indicates—he thereby 
ultimately argues that this was only part of an evolution of the 
concept of abstract right. Thereby what for Ritter appeared to be 
a new account of temporality and historicity, e.g., of philosophy’s 
13 It should be obvious that I use the term following Badiou 2009a.
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being-conditioned by non-philosophical practices, is for Haber-
mas always already conceived against the background of a stable 
form of historical transformation, i.e., evolution. Hegel endorses 
the revolution as an element of an overarching historic-evolution-
ary process within which the former is in the last instance but a 
cog in the grand machine of history. Hegel thereby in advance 
sublates the revolution and through its very endorsement turns 
out to be the defender of a higher stability and order. Philosophy 
overcomes its own being-conditioning by what happens outside 
of it by identifying in it the sign of a grand scheme. Philosophy 
is therefore never conditioned by historical events in Hegel, but 
is rather a megalomaniac practice of Belehren, of instructing how 
to read conceptual signs. Hegel’s ingenuity is that in his very 
endorsement of history he sublated historicity, in endorsing the 
revolution he opts for restoration, a tendency that Habermas 
detects in Hegel’s philosophy of the state. Habermas’s reading is 
problematic for a number of reasons that are not relevant to the 
present argument. But it is also crucial that he emphasizes how 
Hegel’s very account of temporality and of philosophical prac-
tice gains an intelligibility and hence must be thought from the 
perspective of the historical event of the revolution, even though 
he sees in it a defence mechanism against it that is so defensive it 
dehistoricizes history itself.
Rebecca Comay formulates another option of how to con-
ceive of philosophy’s conditioning by the revolution. She empha-
sizes the fact, disregarded by both Ritter and Habermas, that in 
the Phenomenology Hegel’s dissection of absolute freedom and 
terror is followed by a reflection on morality and ultimately on 
Kant (Comay 2011). She demonstrates how Kant is what people 
in Germany got instead of a revolution. This means that Kant’s 
revolution of the way of thinking, is a way of philosophy being 
conditioned by the revolution. But it is precisely as Habermas 
sought to criticize Hegel for, a way of warding off the revolution 
by endorsing it. Kant is a defence mechanism against revolution 
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through its endorsement. As Comay shows, Hegel develops how 
Kantian morality can be read as an internalization of the terror of 
the French Revolution in the form of a moral law that does not 
stop demanding more the more we fulfil it. But this cannot but 
mean that whatever follows afterwards in the Phenomenology 
must be read as philosophy already thinking through the lens of 
the revolution. This is to say that even the revolution not happen-
ing (in Germany) will be thought through from the perspective 
of the revolution.14 This is significant for the present purposes, 
because Comay thereby clearly indicates what it means that 
philosophy—the Phenomenology was for some time conceived 
as introduction to the system—thinks in the mode and through 
the eyes of the revolution. 
Whatever is and also whatever is not is an effect of what 
happens. Even its concepts of being and not-being are thus a 
result of thinking from the standpoint of the (historical) event. 
In consequence this means that what happens in the transition 
from the Phenomenology into the Logic can be read as a depiction 
of a revolutionary act of creation—revolutionary in the sense of 
massively historical, namely the creation of a new “nature and a 
[novel] finite spirit” (Hegel 2010, p. 29). Hegel’s philosophy is 
conditioned by the revolution. Therefore he presents us with the 
immanence of the revolution, after depicting what it means to 
work through all our defences against it, including the endorse-
ment of a revolution in our ways of thinking (Kant). Even a 
revolution in thought can serve as protective shield against history 
proper. But philosophy can also, and this is what Hegel’s Logic 
will do, enable a fully immanent perspective: thinking in modus 
revolutionarii.15 This obviously does not mean that the problem 
14 This is why for Comay the Phenomenology depicts an elaborate pro-
cess of mourning running through all possible defense mechanisms by means 
of which we attempt to avoid revolutionizing.
15 I began elaborating such a reading in Ruda 2019.
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that is the revolution is thereby solved. But it indicates that 
thinking cannot avoid thinking in terms of incompleteness (and 
explore different forms of consistency). The French Revolution 
as problem is the purlieu not in- but afforming Hegel’s thought. 
An Umschlag. Its condition and envelope. Like a historical letter. 
Sent and received. 
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